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Abstract. We consider the potential to use co-modelling and co-simulation in
the design of dependably resilient Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). Resilience is
widely discussed in the public discourse on CPSs, but has many definitions. We
propose the description of system resilience in terms of a multi-attribute profile
which may be used as a basis for assessment and trade-off analysis in CPSs.
Our profile has a particular focus on description of system recovery behaviour.
As a first evaluation of the concept, we present a case study based on a VDM
and 20-sim co-model of a small smart grid illustrating causal chains that cross
the cyber-physical boundary. An evaluation of the study leads to suggestions for
further proof-of-concept studies that experiment with increasingly challenging
CPS architectures.
1 Introduction
In complex environments, resilience often spells success, while even the most
brilliantly engineered fixed solutions are often insufficient or counterproduc-
tive.
McChrystal et al. [1]
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) formed from the integration of computational and
physical processes [2] are a natural evolution of embedded devices in networked envi-
ronments [3]. Examples range from medical devices and automotive control systems, to
“smart” infrastructures in areas such as road traffic management and energy grids [4,5].
In many cases, existing physical infrastructure is overlaid with a computer network that
– in principle – offers more efficient and reactive control with greater autonomy than
is delivered by individual embedded or centralised architectures. However, computer
networks are complex (in the sense that small changes can have remote and large-scale
effects), and are vulnerable to failure and attack modes that can be difficult to predict
and test. Adding cyber networks to physical infrastructure is therefore a risky business.
Controlling this risk requires both design methods that promote detection and avoidance
of vulnerabilities, and building-in the capacity to recover from unanticipated faults or
attacks.
Much of the public discourse on infrastructure is concerned with resilience. Al-
though widely used, the term appears to have a range of meanings in different sec-
tors. The United Kingdom’s National Resilience Capabilities programme sees it as “the
2ability of assets and networks to anticipate, absorb, adapt to and recover from disrup-
tion” [6]. It is open to debate whether this might be defined in terms of properties such
as fault avoidance, detection, tolerance and recovery [7], but the term is often used in
a broader sense to include adaptive capacity [8]. Given the range of facets of resilience
that are important in different application sectors, it is apparent that a nuanced charac-
terisation of resilience is needed to facilitate disciplined engineering.
Engineering dependably resilient CPSs is a demanding goal [9], and many CPSs
emerge or are developed without resilience in mind at all. Model-based systems engi-
neering methods offer considerable promise, but are challenged by the independence
and heterogeneity of CPS constituents. Several of these challenges are addressed by co-
modelling technology such as that explored in INTO-CPS1. Predecessor projects such
as DESTECS2 and COMPASS3 demonstrated model-based engineering for fault toler-
ance in these settings. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether co-modelling can help to
deliver dependably resilient CPSs. This is the subject of our current work.
We discuss background and related work on resilience in Section 2. Given the need
for a nuanced characterisation of resilience, we discuss resilience profiling (Section 3)
and consider how this might be realised in heterogeneous co-models of CPSs. An ex-
ample based on a simple smart grid is presented (Section 4). Our work is at an early
stage; Section 5 describes future directions.
2 Background and Related Work
We aim to provide usable methods and tools for engineering dependably resilient CPSs.
In this section, we describe the scope and background to our work. We briefly indicate
what we mean by a CPS, explain why we focus on model-based techniques and intro-
duce our baseline tools. We then examine in more detail the existing work on resilience
profiling in CPS-related contexts.
Multidisciplinary Model-Based Design for CPSs
A CPS integrates computational and physical processes [2]. CPS engineering therefore
should therefore address the integration of methods and tools from different (discrete
and continuous) domains and disciplines [10]. The focus of much current work, includ-
ing our own, is on systems of networked computing elements, including “smart” de-
vices, that together deliver emergent properties on which reliance is placed. This adds
to the mix important systems-of-systems (SoS) aspects, including the need to integrate
independently owned and managed systems, the ability to reason about the composition
of the contractual interfaces between them, and the ability to deal with dynamically
evolving structures over the life of the CPS [11, 12].
Collaborative and multi-paradigm Model-Based Design (MBD) techniques have been
proposed as a means of evaluating alternative architectures and functionality, and pro-
viding early identification of defects in CPSs [13]. Realising the value of such ap-
proaches requires a semantic basis for linking models given in diverse notations, the
1 http://into-cps.au.dk/
2 http://www.destecs.org/
3 http://www.compass-research.eu/
3ability to compose abstract descriptions of interfaces between system elements, and the
ability to describe architectures explicitly.
Much research builds on hybrid systems as a common semantic framework for
CPSs [14]. Rather than work with a single formalism, we aim at an extensible frame-
work able to integrate the diverse formalisms used in practice. In the work discussed
here, we take Crescendo4 as a baseline technology. In Crescendo, a model of a CPS
is actually a co-model with discrete-event (DE) and continuous time (CT) models (in
VDM/Overture and 20-sim respectively) as its constituents. Crucially for our work,
the approach allows the direct modelling of causal chains across the cyber-physical
boundary. A bespoke co-simulation harness implements an operational semantics that
manages time and communication between the separate DE and CT models running in
their own simulators. The emerging INTO-CPS tool chain promises to extend this to an
n-ary multi-modelling approach, allowing co-simulation of executables derived from
multiple modelling tools [15]. It leverages Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP)
to permit extensible and reusable semantics [16]. At the time of writing, the INTO-CPS
framework is not quite able to handle multi-models of the type needed for our smart
grid applications, and we remain with Crescendo for the moment.
Resilience
Resilience is important in many fields [17, 18]. In materials science it is “the ability
of a material to absorb energy when deformed elastically and to return it when un-
loaded” [19]. In IT and organisational contexts, a resilient control system has been
characterised as “one that maintains state awareness and an accepted level of opera-
tional normalcy in response to disturbances, including threats of an unexpected and
malicious nature” [20]. In the context of power systems, it is seen as the ability of a
system to degrade gracefully under extreme perturbations, and recover quickly after
the events have ceased [21]. In socioecological systems Carpenter et al. argue that an
assessment of system resilience must be qualified by specifying which system config-
uration and disturbances are of interest (resilience ‘of what, to what, and under what
conditions’) [22]. Recent European research calls on crisis management see resilience
as the ability to reduce the impact of disruptive events and the recovery time [23].
Together, the approaches in the literature reflect the idea that resilience as a com-
posite property: a system cannot simply be said to either be resilient or not, but may be
said to show some characteristics of resilience in response to a certain set of faults or
attacks under certain circumstances. There is a also a trade space here: for example, a
system may be show resilience to a certain set of attacks, but at the expense of becom-
ing less resilient to others, or at the price of slower recovery. Again, being able to trace
cause and effect as they go across the cyber-physical boundary is critical to effective
model-based engineering of resilience.
Among the few current research projects directly addressing CPS resilience are
ADREAM5, FORCES6, and SURE7. ADREAM aims to investigate and develop core
4 http://crescendotool.org/
5 https://www.laas.fr/public/en/adream-project
6 https://www.cps-forces.org/
7 http://cps-vo.org/group/sos/sure/
4technologies, methodologies and components that will enable the successful design of
dependable CPSs. FORCES aims to increase the resilience of large-scale networked
CPSs in the key areas of energy delivery, transportation, and energy management in
buildings. SURE will develop foundations and tools for designing, building, and assur-
ing CPSs that can maintain essential system properties in the presence of adversaries.
Although few outputs are available from these projects at this time, there is an emerging
body of work aiming to address CPS resilience.
Resilience Profiling
To analyse resilience in model-based CPS design, we need a working intuitive char-
acterisation of resilience. We adopt some of the terminology of faults, errors and fail-
ures [7] in that we regard a failure as the deviation of a delivered service from correct
service. An error occurs when the state of the system deviates from those required to
deliver a correct service. A fault is the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error. An
error does not necessarily cause a failure, but it is possible one or more errors may.
Throughout this report we describe a specific fault–error–failure casual chain as a re-
silience scenario.
Rather than identify a single resilience metric, we treat it as a multi-attribute property
defined in what we will call a resilience profile. The idea of a multifaceted definition of
resilience is not new. Jackson [24] proposes a representation of resilience composed of
four attributes:
Capacity: the ability of a system to absorb or adapt to a disturbance without a total
loss of performance or structure.
Tolerance: the exhibition of graceful degradation near the boundary of a system’s per-
formance.
Flexibility: the systems ability to restructure itself in response to disruptions.
Inter-element Collaboration: collaborations, or communication and cooperation be-
tween human elements of a system.
A resilience scenario is divided into three aspects:
Avoidance: the preventive aspects of system resilience in response to a disruption,
either internal or external.
Survival: implies that the system has not been destroyed or totally incapacitated and
continues to function when experiencing a disturbance.
Recovery: the capability of surviving a major disturbance with reduced performance.
This capability is a focus of system resilience.
Pflanz [25] extends Jackson’s characterisation, applying it to command and control sys-
tems. Although Pflanz does not consider inter-element collaboration, he subdivides the
first three of Jackson’s attributes into the constituent facets listed in Figure 1. Jackson’s
resilience scenarios were then implemented by Pflanz as temporal phases, as shown in
Figure 2.
Pflanz’s work focuses on the survival phase, where capacity, tolerance and flexibility
provide means of analysing resilience in this phase alone. However, there is only limited
further discussion of ways in which to characterise recovery.
5Fig. 1. Outline of Pflanz’s Resilience Profile.
Fig. 2. Avoidance, Survival and Recovery as temporal phases, from [25].
Research Landscape
Although increasing importance is attached to the resilience of the CPSs on which we
depend, there is no widely accepted definition of the concept, still less methods and
tools for he lack of a coherent definition of resilience in the field, and a lack of meth-
ods for analysing resilience as a profile, especially in the recovery phase. In our current
work, we therefore have two main goals. First, to deliver a resilience profile that de-
scribes resilience in the context of CPS, specifically characterising the recovery phase.
Secondly we will provide methods for analysing co-models in the MBD of CPS.
3 Resilience Profiling
In this section we describe our approach to delivering the two goals mentioned at the
end of Section 2. We extend the resilience profile described with new attributes which
elaborate the recovery phase. We initially present one new attribute ‘Recovery’ with
three facets described below and indicated in Figure 3:
Rate of Recovery: the rate at which system performance returns to an acceptable level.
6Available Recovery Capacity: the available performance margin from the current op-
erating levels to the expected recovery operating level.
Actual Recovery Capacity: the actual performance margin from the current operating
levels to the recovery operating levels.
Fig. 3. Extending the resilience profile to characterise recovery.
As shown in Figure 4, the (average) Rate of Recovery (in blue) is measured by the
Measure of Performance Capability (y-axis) divided by time (x-axis). The Actual Re-
covery Capacity (in red) is measured from the point in which the performance value
settles within a range of acceptable levels, however never reaches the Available Recov-
ery Capacity (purple) which we assume is higher. Further analysis of resilience lies in
the ability to compare our attributes in our profile (as shown in Section 4).
Fig. 4. Recovery Attributes: Rate of Recovery, Available Recovery Capacity and Actual Recovery
Capacity.
Given a co-model that can co-simulate a resilience scenario, how can we assess the
resilience of the system of interest according to our extended profile? First, we must
7ensure that the co-model is competent in the sense that it incorporates sufficient features
to allow resilience attributes to be assessed; this amount to ensuring we can observe the
properties needed for the y-axis of the graphs shown in Figures 2 and 4. This could
potentially involve instrumenting the constituent models by adding, e.g. methods in
Overture or 20-sim. Second, we can visualise or post-process co-simulation output data
to generate the elements needed for analysis against our resilience profile. in either case,
the key question lies with the CPS design engineer on exactly what properties need to
be measured. In some cases the y-axis measure may be composed of properties both
cyber and physical in nature.
4 Example
In this section we describe an example co-model from the smart grids domain. We first
explain why we have chosen this application area to evaluate our extended resilience
profile. Second we demonstrate how we can use our co-model to produce sufficient data
so that we are be able to analyse the resilience of an example grid.
Smart Grids
In seeking to extend the resilience profile so as to better incorporate recovery, we need
to validate the approach with example studies. In order to be credible, these should be
in a well established and accepted CPS domain [4,5]. In order to test the capabilities of
formalisms, they should be capable of incorporating a series of increasingly demand-
ing architectures, including centralised, distributed, and modular control. Finally, the
resilience of the systems of interest should be both desirable to have, and challenging
to deliver.
Smart power grids present one such area. Such a grid is a complex ecosystem of het-
erogeneous (co-operating) entities that interact in order to deliver specific functionality
related to the generation, transmission, storage and consumption of (usually electrical)
energy [4]. It is an archetypal example of a CPS, in which the power network is overlaid
with a computing and communication network, and the two are coupled together into
what is generally perceived as a single system of interest [5,26]. CPS technology is seen
as an integral part of the smart grid concept and resilience in smart grids is identified
as a key challenge [9, 27]. There is interest in increasing local control and autonomy
to better match supply and demand in smart grids, and the idea of a local microgrid
provides a modular control concept. Finally, significant reliance is placed on the energy
supply, even in the face of natural or human-made disruptions. Together these factors
make smart grids a suitable example domain for our work.
Co-model Example
To demonstrate our approach to analyse our resilience profile, we have created an exam-
ple co-model of a Smart Grid with a centralised controller in Crescendo. In our example,
we model the physical environment in 20-sim which includes a physical description of
8Fig. 5. 20-sim CT model: An example smart grid.
the grid’s components ranging from power stations and transmission lines, to sensors
and actuators.
Figure 5 is a representation of the CT model in our co-model example in 20-sim.
This gives us an overview of our physical system, in which we include 1 PowerStation,
1 SubStation, 3 TransmissionLines, 3 Switches and 1 House. To give context, Figure
6 shows us the CT logic for Switch1. This is an example of the types of CT equations
present in our physical model in 20-sim.
Fig. 6. A code snippet from within Switch1.
Our DE model is written using VDM-RT. This is where we write our controller logic
and any other cyber functionality present in our CPS. Figure 7 shows the controller logic
used in our co-model when deciding to switch transmission lines. The logic changes
switch state if the voltage level falls below a ‘minLevel’ threshold (minLevel is a shared
parameter between CT and DE models).
Cross-Domain Resilience Scenarios
Cross-domain resilience scenarios are those in which the causal chain transits the bound-
ary between cyber and physical elements. We look at how cyber faults can lead to phys-
ical failures. An example of a cyber fault is a digital controller that fails to execute its
9
private controlLoop : () ==> ()
controlLoop() ==
(
cycles(2)
(
-- retrieve the level values from Co-sim
dcl level1 : real := levelSensor1.getLevel();
dcl level2 : real := levelSensor2.getLevel();
dcl level3 : real := levelSensor3.getLevel();
if level1 >1 and level1 < minLevel then
(
switch1.setOpen();
switch2.setClosed();
);
);
); 
Fig. 7. A code snippet of controller logic
control logic even though it is receiving signal data. We model this in Overture by creat-
ing a subclass of our centralised controller class. Before we co-simulate, we initialise a
faulty version (subclass) of our controller class. This is in line with the fault modelling
mechanisms demonstrated in [28]. The fault would cause the switches in our Smart
Grid to remain in their initial state. Our controller would never switch to a different
transmission line and thus may lead to the propagation of physical failures within the
system.
We can also characterise physical faults leading to cyber failures. For example, we
may consider a faulty voltage sensor in the house. This sends only the first voltage
value. We can model this in 20-sim by creating a second (faulty) implementation of
the equation model of our house. Before we co-simulate we can switch to the faulty
implementation. The value sent to the centralised controller would be an outdated value,
and so the controller cannot switch transmission lines if the voltage level falls below the
minimum threshold (shown in Figure 7).
Resilience Profiling
To allow for the analysis of resilience, we must be able to evaluate our resilience profile
against data produced from our co-models. To test our scenario, we run our co-model
through a co-simulation in Crescendo. The PowerStation in our study provides power
to the SubStation. The SubStation uses a step-down transformer to reduce the voltage
to 240Volts(V). This power is then split across 3 transmission lines. The first source
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is sent across TransmissionLine1, where it passes a closed switch to get to the house.
The second and third sources of power are sent across TransmissionLine2 and Trans-
missionLine3 respectively, where they encounter open switches and do not reach the
house. The power from TransmissionLine2 and TransmissionLine3 are considered as
contingencies in the case TransmissionLine1 fails to provide adequate service.
In our scenario, TransmissionLine1 is faulty, which has lead to a steady decrease in
voltage output. Our centralised controller checks the voltage level the house receives. If
this level falls below a threshold, the centralised controller opens the switch to Trans-
missionLine1 and closes the switch to TransmissionLine2.
From Figure 8 we see a significant voltage drop from TransmissionLine1 (blue) until
around 1 second into the simulation. This is when the controller has opened the switch
from TransmissionLine1.
Fig. 8. A comparison of the output voltage from TransmissionLine1 and TranmissionLine2.
Figure 8 shows us the comparison between the voltage received by the house from
TransmissionLine1 (blue) and TransmissionLine2 (red). The cyber controller in our DE
model recognises when the voltage from TransmissionLine1 falls below our thresh-
old and switches to TransmissionLine2. The house now receives power once again -
although at a reduced voltage (220V).
With this data we demonstrate how we can analyse the resilience of our example
using our resilience profile. As shown in Figure 9, from our co-model output we can
analyse the three facets of our recovery phase.
1. Rate of Recovery - In Figure 9 we can see the gradient of the voltage increase is
our Rate of Recovery (blue). In our example the switch in our transmission lines
happens almost instantaneously which results in a vertical line on our graph. In this
case we would have an undefined gradient. From our analysis perspective in the
recovery phase this is the optimal rate at which our line can reach its Available and
Actual Recovery Capacity.
2. Available Recovery Capacity - The Available Recovery Capacity is shown in pur-
ple in Figure 9. This is the maximum potential in which our system may recover
11
Fig. 9. An analysis of the recovery phase from a Smart Grid co-model with a centralised con-
troller.
to. In our case TransmissionLine1’s voltage dropped to 0, and the maximum dif-
ference the house can receive is the limit of our initial transmission line which is
240V. This follows that our Available Recovery Capacity is 240V.
3. Actual Recovery Capacity - The Actual Recovery Capacity is shown in red. In this
case TransmissionLine2 is a line operating at 220V as opposed to 240V. Therefore
the Actual Recovery Capacity is 220V. This is not always the case, as performance
may be recovered fully, to the Available Recovery Capacity.
Resilience Trade-Off
Crescendo allows us to model resilience scenarios across both cyber and physical do-
mains. We present a resilience scenario in which we can perform resilience profiling
and trade-off analysis of our Smart Grid co-model. To perform trade-off analysis we
consider two resilience scenarios:
1. TransmissionLine1 - TransmissionLine2 - TransmissionLine2 produces power
almost instantly but at a reduced voltage (220V).
2. TransmissionLine1 - TransmissionLine3 - TransmissionLine3 produces a higher
voltage (240V), but at the expense of time.
In our example we have modelled each scenario, and analysed the results. Figure
10 shows us a comparison between scenario 1 (left) and scenario 2 (right). In scenario
1 we can clearly see that TransmissionLine2 switches almost instantly and provides
power to the house at a voltage of 220V. In scenario 2 the house receives power from
TransmissionLine3 at around 5 seconds, this is approximately a 4 second delay from
when TransmissionLine1 is switched off. It is here a CPS design engineer must consider
which is more important, the Actual Recovery Capacity, or the Rate of Recovery.
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Figure 11 shows the analysis of the Recovery attribute in our resilience profile. It
is shown that the Available Recovery Capacity (purple) is the same in both scenarios
(240V), as this is the maximum potential voltage our house can receive under normal
operation. The Actual Recovery Capacity (red) for scenario 1 is 220V, whereas in sce-
nario 2 it is 240V. The Rate of Recovery in scenario 1 is a vertical line and so we have
an undefined gradient as the switch is almost instantaneous. However due to the delay
of switching in scenario 2, our (average) Rate of Recovery becomes 240V divided by
4 seconds, this gives us a Recovery Rate of 60V/s. With this data a CPS design engi-
neer can assess the trade-off between the Actual Recovery Capacity and the Rate of
Recovery facets, in the Recovery Attribute of our resilience profile.
Fig. 10. A comparison of resilience scenarios.
An important note to make about our trade-off analysis example as seen in Figure
11, resides in the fact that our Rate of Recovery facet (blue) is compromised of our
voltage level and time. The Rate of Recovery facet will always rely on the relation and
importance of the y-axis and the x-axis on our graph. We calculated the (average) Rate
of Recovery in Figure 11 for scenario 2 as 60V/s, however we can see from the graph
that there is no voltage supplied at all until 5 seconds. This is due to the discrete nature
of switching transmission lines in our model. This information may be of interest to
a CPS design engineer. For other resilience scenarios, the engineer may wish to have
some values of performance available leading up to the Actual Recovery Capacity, as
opposed to our co-model example, in which the transmission line is either switched on
or off. In this case we can analyse our recovery phase further at more time steps. It
is for reasons like this that we seek to extend our resilience profile to a more refined
13
Fig. 11. An analysis of trade-off.
and sophisticated version. Although this is somewhat a trivial example, it describes the
basis of our resilience profile and demonstrates how we can perform trade-off analysis
between attributes and facets.
5 Evaluation and Further Work
We have provided motivation for being interested in resilience as a property of cyber-
physical systems. Recognising that it is a multi-faceted property, we have extended
an existing resilience profile with additional features that characterise recovery phases,
and demonstrated that it is possible to assess this aspect of resilience on CPS co-models
using Crescendo by means of a simple example from the domain of smart grids. We
have illustrated resilience scenarios that cross the cyber-physical boundary and have
demonstrated the potential to assess trade-offs.
Our work is at a preliminary stage, but we believe that there is potential to build
useful methods for CPS resilience engineering on top of co-modelling technology of the
kind pioneered by Overture, 20-sim, Crescendo and INTO-CPS. We naturally expect to
progress from the Crescendo framework to INTO-CPS, exploiting the nascent SysML
architectural modelling methods developed in that context as well as the improving
performance of tools. We hope to take advantage of order of magnitude improvements
in co-simulation and design space exploration performance that will allow us to evaluate
our resilience profile on system architectures that reflect the potential complexity of
emerging CPSs. These will include decentralisation of control, and eventually increased
localised responsibility and autonomy in smart grids. Modular architectures such as
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microgrids (in which local smart grids negotiate with one another to trade energy) may
serve to improve or impede facets of resilience, for example. We will assess the extent
to which the abstractions currently available in VDM-RT help or hinder the modelling
of such structures.
As discussed at the end of Section 4, we seek to extend our profile in order to better
encapsulate the interesting design decisions that a CPS design engineer may face when
considering the resilience of a system. In the future we look towards generating data
using the INTO-CPS tool chain described in Section 1. This would allow us to profile
the resilience of models of CPSs that have been generated with different semantics
across a variety of simulation tools.
Finally, we note that there are – at least at a certain abstraction level – significant
similarities between CPSs in different infrastructure domains. We might expect that
some modelling patterns might be shared between, say, negotiating microgrids, and
negotiating traffic flow systems. There is therefore significant potential in identifying
and exploiting those patterns as a means of sharing experience between otherwise quite
separate application domains.
As societal and business dependence on cyber-physical systems grows, we believe
that the need to take a systematic view of resilience – and in particular recovery – will
only grow. Through their support for varied levels of abstraction, and their capacity to
integrate with hitherto isolated tools, Overture and VDM have a vital role to play in
addressing this requirement in the future.
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